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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
\\'I I.~Lir\ ~~ E. N ,\ \ .. l..~OR, \ \r ILIJI.l\:\1 C,OSSE\r, J1\l\IES L.
XJ~:\'"II.~LE,

and llLAE E. HAN-

J>failltiffs and

Appellants~

vs.
s~\LT

LAKE CIT\.. CORPORA'riOX. a 1nunicipal corporation, J.
Bl{~\Cl\J~:x LEE, HERBERT F.
S ~I~\ R '1\ GEORGE B. CAT:\ll"LL. CONRAD HARRISON,
JOE L. CHRISTENSEN, RAY
ROI.~I~,SON. and ALDER-\VAL1.~1\C'E, IXC., a Utah corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
10114

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
PREFACE
This Honorable Court is an accepted and much
cited authority in the subject matter of this appealzoning. 'I'here has been no question since the landmark
case of Euclid, Ohio v. A n1be1' Realty, 272 U.S. 865,
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47 S. -Ct. 114~ that such zoning statutes as we have in
Utah are "valid exercises of authority." This Court
has refined and expounded and made a part of our lives
this. important area of law in our complex society. It
would be redundant to recite all of the well reasoned
and comprehensive cases contributed by this Court.
You have said that the exercise of zoning power "is
definitely a legisl~tive function and activity" and that
the Board of City Commissioners "'is given the power in
a broad general grant, and without any right of revie"',
of zoning the city as to uses to_ .which land within the
city can be put." Walton v. The Tracy_ Loan and Trust
Co11tpany et al.~ 97 U. 249, 92 P.2d 724, 727. As a legislative ·function is limited to the scope of review of any
legislative action._ The decision of the legislative body
will not be disturbed unless such decision is an abuse of
the legislative discretion.
Again in Marshall v. Salt Lake City~ 105 U. Ill,
141 P.2d 704, this Court leads the way: "It must be
considered as a whole to see if it is designed to accomplish such (police power and general welfare power)
purpose; ·if it could pro1note _·the general \\'elf are; or
even it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest
of the general welfare, that act should be upheld. The
wisdom of the plan, the necessity for zoning, the number
and nature of the districts to be created, the boundaries
.thereof and- the uses therein permitted, are matters
which lie in the discretion of the governing body of the
city. Unless the action of such body is arbitrary discrirninatory or unreasonable~ or clearly offends some
J
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prot,isiuu of the con sf it ution or statute, the court must

uphold it, if "lL,ifhin the grant of' power to the municipali(lJ.
''It is pri ntarif.lJ the du l,tJ of the city to make the
clru~.'li jicat iu us. If a clra;si fication is reasonably doubtful, flu: ,iudyn1ent of' the court 1olil not be substituted
for the .iudyntcnl of the cif.tJ." (Emphasis added) .
.t\nd finally, in Ga;ljland v. Salt Lake County, 11
lT.:!d 307, 358 P.:ld 633, this court reasonably, and we
think in the instant case, with finality, answers appellants, protests. Your words in this case are quoted at
length in the following argument.

Assun1ing the general la"' of zoning as above said
is not seriously contested in this state, we contain ourseh·es herein to the relatively narrow points raised by
appellants' brief on appeal.

Sl",ATE~IENT

OF N A'fURE OF CASE

This is an action challenging the validity of a zoning a1uendn1ent ordinance enacted by the Salt L~ke City
Board of Commissioners and attempting to enjoin the
issuance of building permits in accordance therewith.

DISPOSITION IX LO,,TER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court granted defendant's motion for dismissal upon stipulations of counsel
and the pleadings at the pretrial conference.
5
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON API>EAL
Two of the plaintiffs seek a reversal of the judgment of dismissal granted to defendants by the District
Court.

STATEMEN'l,

0~,

FACTS

The facts as set forth in the appellants' brief are
essentially correct. ,-fhe Board of Commissioners of Salt
Lake City passed an ordinance changing the zoning
classification of a major portion of a city block located
between 2nd and 3rd South Streets and 6th and 7th
East Streets of said city. 'fhe zoning was changed from
a Residential R-6 classification to a Business B-3 classification. ( R. 8) . The action was taken after due and
regular notice. (R. 21-22) and after advertised and
proper public hearings. ( R. 17-18, 21) . .1\. copy of the
amended ordinance is a part of this record ( R. 8) together with the Use District Map which was altered
thereby. (Attached to affidavit R. 21-22). It was agreed
at pre-trial that the said map was a photostatic copy
of the use map of Salt Lake City. Counsel for appellant
further agreed that the map now in the record \\'as "some
evidence" of the general and comprehensive plan of
zoning in the city. ( R. 33) .
The ordinance change "Tas sought by petition of
Alder~ ''Tallace, Inc., owners and optionees of the instant property. (R. 34-35). The change was in accordance with the orderly development of Salt Lake City.
6
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"\ perusal of the l" se District ~lap indicates the classiti<:ations of property in the Yicinity and the tendency
of business use extending east,vard and southward as
the city expands and the population grows.

l 1 laintifl's and appellant brought this action to deelare the aetion of the legislative body of Salt Lake
City Yoid as an action in excess of the city's power and
authority and to estop the1n from issuing building perntits. (R. 7) .
..:\t the pre-trial conference defendants moved that
the con1pluint be dismissed with prejudice upon the
stipulations at pre-trial and upon the pleadings. The
('Oillplaint "·as dis1nissed with prejudice. Plaintiffsappellants have brought this appeal from this order of
dismissal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
'fHE LO\\rER COuRT DID NOT ERR IN
HOLDIXG AS A ~iA'fTER OF LAW FROM
'fHE PLEADINGS AND PRE-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS THAT THE CITY HAD ACTED
'\TITHIN ITS AUTHORITY IN ADOPTING
'fHE QlTESTIONED r\.:\IENDMENT TO 'fHE
ZOXIXG ORDINANCE.
Sections 10-9-1 and 10-9-2, U.C.A. 1953, grant to
Salt Lake City the po,ver "to regulate and restrict ...
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the location and use of buildings, structures and land
for trade, industry, residence or other purposes'' and to
"divide the n1unicipality into districts" of such nu1nber,
scope and area as may be deemed best suited to carry
out the purposes of [the statute]." Section 10-9-3,
U .C.A. 1953, provides as follows:
"Such regulations shall be 1nade in accordance
with a comprehensive plan designed to lessen congestion in the streets, to secure safety from fire,
panic and other dangers, to promote health and
the general welfare, to provide adequate light
and air, to prevent the overcrowding of land, to
avoid undue concentration of population, to
facilitate adequate provision for transportation,
water, sewage, schools, parks and other public
requirements. Such regulations shall be made
with reasonable consideration, among other
things, to the character of the district and its
peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with
a view to conserving the value of buildings and
encouraging the most appropriate use of land
throughout th city."
The main contention of the appellants is that the
lower court \Yas in error in considering the Zoning Ordinnace of Salt Lake City, Utah, together with the Use
District Map of Salt Lake City (Pre-'frial Exhibit
I, following R-22), as evidence from which the "com·
prehensive plan" required under Section 10-9-3, U.C.A.
1953, could be ascertained.
The term "comprehensive plan" as used in our
statute, which term is similarly used in like legislation
in over 40 other states, has been generally defined as "a
8
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gt·neral plan to control and direct the use and developJnent of properly in a n1unicipality or a large part
thereof by dividing it into districts according to the
prl'sent and potential uses of the property." See Words
and l'hrtulfs, J:Jcrnzancnt Edition, Volume 8, as supplenlented, and ('lark v. 1,un,n ('lou neil of Town of West
Jla.rtj'ord, I:~.) ('onn. 476, 14t 1\.2d 327, cited in Appellants' brief.
In the leading case on zoning in this state, Marshall
t Salt Lake l 'ity, 105 U. 111, 141 P.2d 704, 149 A.L.R.
:!H:!, this court recognized that the zoning ordinance
of Salt Lake l'ity, as enacted in August, 1927, was the
en1bodin1ent of a ··comprehensive zoning plan" which
had its historic origin prior to 1920. In answering its
O\Vll question ( 141 P.2d 707) of whether the zoning
provisions for s1nall business districts within residential
districts "·as "a violation of the statute requiring a comprehensive plan" this court, in upholding the city's
zoning ordinance and atnendinen ts thereto in question,
quoted the follo,ving from page 129 of Metzenbaum,s
La'l'-' of Zoning (141 P.2d 709-710):
1•

" 'In a comprehensive plan, the whole territory
of the n1unicipality is divided into districts some
of "·hich may be large, some sn1all * * * each
"·ith its o'vn standards of use, height and occupaney; each selected by the consideration of the
conm1unity health and general welfare as applied
to that particular district~ the (chole constituting
a co1nprehensive plan for the best manner of conserving and assuring th greatest safety and welfare of the entire community.' " (Emphasis
added.)
9
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It is clear beyond doubt from the above that this
court has itself recognized the zoning ordinance of Salt
Lake City and its attendant Use District Map as incorporating the "comprehensiYe plan" contemplated by
Section 10-9-3, U.C.A. 1953. 'I'he appellants, however,
fail to point this out in their brief and cite the case of
Hochbe1·g v. Borough of Freehold_, 40 N.J. Super. 276,
123 A.2d 46, as authority for their contention that the
term ''comprehensive plan'' signifies something other
than the pre-existing zoning ordinance itself. 'fhis case
was decided in 1956 by the Superior Court of Ne\v
Jersey, Appellate Division, which is an intermediate
court of appeal in the New Jersey judiciary. In 1957
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, which is the highest
court of appeal in that state, in the case of Kozesnik v.
Township of Montgomery_, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1,
'had occasion to consider the validity of an amendatory
zoning ordinance as being "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" under a statute in all respects similar
to Section 10-9-3, U.C.A. 1953. The New Jersey court
held as follows at 131 A.2d 7-8:
"The Zoning Act nowhere provides that the
comprehensive plan shall exist in son1e physical
form outside the ordinance itself. The question
thereof is whether that requirement inheres in the
very nature of a 'co1nprehensive plan.'
"There has been little judicial consideration
of the precise attributes of a comprehensive plan.
Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive
Plan," supra, (68 Harv. L. Rev. 1154). Our own
decisions emphasize that its office is to prevent a
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en pricious exercise of the legislative power resulting- in haphazard or piece1neal zoning. (Citing
east·s) . \ r ithou t Yen turing au exact definition,
it tnny he said for present purposes that 'plan,
connotes an integrated product of a rational process and ~cotnprehensive' requires something beyond a piecetneal approach, both to be revealed
hv the ordinance considered in relation to the
physical facts and the purposes authorized by
lt.S. 40:50-32, N".J.S ..c\. Such being the requirerntnfs of a co1nprchcnsive plan~ no re~on is perceived 1.L'hlJ we should infer the Legislature intended by necessary i1nplication that the comprehensive plan be portra.tJed in some physical form
uutsidc the ordinance itself. A plan may readily
be rct,caled in an e,nd-product- here the zoning
ordinal/('£' and no more is required by the
statute." (Emphasis adde~).
Obviously referring to the lower appellate court's
rensoning in the Hochberg case that the embodiment
of the cotnprehensi,~e plan in the zoning ordinance itself
'rould freeze the ordinance beyond amendment, the
X e"· Jersey Supren1e Court observed as follows at 131
.-\.2d 8:
''The comprehensiYe plan embraced by an
original zoning ordinance is of course mutable.
If ev-ents should prove that the plan did not fully
or correctly meet or anticipate the needs of the
total community, amendments may be made,
* * * and if the ordinance as thus amended reveals a comprehensive plan, it is of no moment
that the ne"· plan so revealed differs from the
original one.''
In 1959. the Xe'v Jersey Supreme Court, in the
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case of Ward v. Montgornery Township., 28 N.J. 529,
147 A.2d 248, reaffirmed its decision in the I~ozesnik
case and stated the rule of that state as follows:
"A comprehensive plan has been defined generally as an 'integrated product of a rational process' revealing a physical partition of the Inunicipality reasonably designed to produce a homogenous pattern of location and uniform development of variant land uses. The zoniny ordinance
itself may bespeal., the schc1ne_; there need be no
extrinsic guide.n (Emphasis added).
In light of the foregoing it is clear that the Hochberg case does not represent the law of the state of New
Jersey as asserted by the appellants. Furthermore, the
rule as enunciated by the Supreme Court of New Jersey
is supported by other authorities cited by the appellants
in their brief. Thus Charles M. Haar, Assistant Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, in an article
entitled uln Accordance With A Comprehensive Plan,"
68 Harv. L. Rev .., 1154, 1167, is quoted by appellants
as follows:
"1"his general plan, or comprehensive plan,
with which the (zoning) amendment must conform, is many things to n1any courts. It may be
the basic zoning ordinance itself, or the generalized 'policy' of the local legislative or planning
authorities in respect to their city's development
-or it may be nothing more than a general feeling of fairness and rationality." (Emphasis
added).
The appellants also cite the case of Gayland v. Salt
Lake County., II U.2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, as authority
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for their position thut tnatters extrinsic to the lr se District ~lap or Zoning Ordinance n1ust be considered in
enaet ing anlctuhnents thereto. 11y skillfully extracting
various portions of that opinion, together with their
o\\'11 nbri<lgtuent thereof. they conclude that this court
held in thnt case that a legislative body must consider
nutny extrinsic n1ntters in adopting zoning regulations
sueh as location of businesses, schools and roads, traffic
conditions. gro,\'th in population,. existing land use
l'lassifications and the effect of zoning reclassifications
upon the foregoing. But what the appellants have artfully concealed is the fact that the Supreme Court in
the GalJland case actually assumed wide knowledge of
such tnatters in public officers by virtu~ of their . hold_ing
such offices. 1,hus in discussing the means by ~hich_ a
legislatiYe body tnay inform itself of pertinent _facts in
adopting zoning· regulations, this court stated as follows
at page 636 of 358 P.2d Reporter:
"J.1-,or this reason it is entirely appropriate to
hold public hearings and to allow any interested
parties it desires to give information and to present their ideas on the matter. But this is by no
tneans the only source from which the commissioners tnay obtain such information. From the
fact that the~lJ hold such public offices it is to be
assunzed that they have wide knowledge of the
t'arious conditions and activities in the co1.tnty
bearing on the question of proper zoning~ such
as the location of businesses~ schools, roads and
traffic conditions, gro"lcth i 11 population and housing, the capaci(tJ of utilities, the existing classification of surrounding ]Jroperty~ and the effect
that the ]Jroposed reclassification may have on
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these things and upon the general orderly developrnent of the county. In performing their
duty it is both their privilege and obligation to
take into consideration their own knowledge of
such matte1·s and also to gather available pertinent information from all possible sources and
give consideration to it in making their determination.'' (Emphasis added) .
The holding in the Gayland case actually attributes
to the governing body of a municipality wide knowledge
of conditions, activities and pertinent factual matters
extrinsic to the zoning ordinance and use district map.
The fact that the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
City conducted two separate public hearings upon the
zoning change challenged in this suit is not in dispute.
An examination of the Use District ~lap of Salt Lake
City, pretrial Exhibit 1, will readily reveal the existence
of property zoned for commercial purposes east along
4th South Street to 9th East Street and extending north
and south therefrom. Around the periphery of this
commercially zoned area are small Business ''B-3" districts located 1 or 2 blocks therefrom. On 2nd South
Street the commercially zoned property extends to
within one block of the property involved in this action.
The same is true on 7th East Street. The location of
intermediate business use dist1·icts on the periphery of
an expanding commercial zone is clearly evident. That
the zoning power is definitely a legislative function is
beyond dispute. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co.,
97 U, 249, 92 P.2d 724, 726. That the governing body
of a city has wide discretion in exercising its zoning
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power is like,vise firtnly established. Marshall v. Salt

Lah·e t'if.tJ, supra; (ia.tJland t'. Salt Lake Co1tnty~ supra.
'rhat sut·h discretion is applicable to the wisdom of the
plan. the necessity for zoning, the number and nature
of the distritts to be created, the boundaries thereof and
the uses therein per1nitted is clearly fixed by the decisions of this court. 1llarshall v. Salt Lake City, supra;
Dutl'sl' i'. Salt Lake ("il,IJ, 123 U. 107, 255 P.2d 723.
'fhat the zoning aetion of a city is endowed with a presutnption of Yalidity is also established law. Gayland
t'. Salt Lake CounflJ) supra. 'fhat the court may not
substitute its j udg1nent for that of the Board of Comtnissioners of Salt Lake City in zoning matters is not
subject to dispute. Gayland v. Salt Lake County~ supra,
and cases therein cited; Marshall v. Salt Lake City~
supra . ..c-\.nd it is the court's duty to resolve all doubts
in favor of the commission's action unless such action
is clearly beyond its power. Gayland v. Salt Lake
County, supra. Under the circumstances here presented,
viewed together with the law applicable thereto, it is
clear that the lower court was correct in granting respondents' motion for judgment of dismissal.

CONCLUSION
The action of the Board of Commissioners of Salt
Lake City in rezoning the property which is the subject
of this litigation "~as a presumptively valid legislative act
adopted after t\vo public hearings thereon. In view of
the assumed kno,vledge of public officers relating to
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conditions and activities bearing on the question of
proper zoning, the wide discretion vested in such officers,
and the prohibition against courts substituting their
judgment for that of the Board of Commissioners of
Salt Lake City in adopting zoning regulations and
amendments clearly in accordance with a comprehensive
plan, it must be concluded that the lower court did not
err in granting summary judgment for the respondents.
Respectfully submitted,

HOMER HOLMGREN
SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEY
JACK L. CRELLIN
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ATTORNEY
414 City and County Building
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